This article is more or less going to be an “I have thoughts and they’re a bit everywhere” post rather than a full analytical breakdown of Gray and I think that’s a good thing.
I’ve been championing the idea for the better part of the last couple months. Gray was a near can’t miss prospect, an absolute beast with a slider that a scout told me was “one of the best pitches I’ve ever seen in college.”
The Tigers’ organizational philosophy has progressively caught up to the league and surpassed most of it. They’ve recently hired a stream of pitching coaches and coordinators who are well respected by the entire league and are at the forefront of using video for changes to grips and mechanics, to get the most out of their pitchers.
This isn’t something new to baseball, of course; technology has just provided the ability to perfect old school teachings. We see that in how Avila has talked about the scouting department’s reports on Pelfrey; they believed that simple adjustments in grip and mechanics, which I’m guessing was tunneling, could’ve led to Pelfrey being a major contributor.
The Tigers have fully embraced the Dodgers’ and Rays’ philosophy of high spin sliders and hard fastballs, and Gray fits this mold so well. Fetter getting his hands on a pitcher like Gray, whose slider ranked amongst the league’s best with a near 39% whiff rate and a run value of -13, placing him above guys like Gerrit Cole and just below de Grom (this was found thanks in part to Rogelio Castillo), is a damn dream for the Tigers future. Gray still averaged 95.5 on his fastball, has an above average changeup, and a good cutter. Colorado sucks for pitchers so his numbers are really to be taken with a grain of salt. Fetter has shown an ability to develop changeups at the major league level for his pitchers too, with Lange a primary example of this. A jump in Gray’s cutter and changeup, under Fetter’s tutelage, wouldn’t be a shock either.
Moving Gray into a bigger ballpark that typically plays closer to league average than pitcher friendly, is going to help Gray immensely. It’s no secret that the Tigers need another pitcher, and quite frankly, I’d love to have three new pitchers join the rotation until Turnbull and Boyd return. The team is right on the edge of competing and Gray is one of those pieces that can turn into a key cog in the rotation for the future and recreate the four headed monster that the Tigers used to have.
I would also have zero qualms about trading for Luis Castillo and I would be checking in on that price and see if Joey Wentz and Jose De La Cruz + would be enough for him. This would also make trading Manning for a hitter with control, a la the Jazz Chisolm and Zac Gallen trade, a possibility.
Gray is such a perfect guy to throw 3 years 27 million at. Also, Carlos Rodon got non tendered too and I would be throwing 3 years, 50 million at him to see if that could entice him into signing. Rodon fits in that same mold as Gray, and every pitcher that the Tigers drafted in 2021. I have my doubts over whether or not Rodon would take that but his injury history scares me too much to go long term with him.
(For educational purposes a key is included at the end of each section for all sabermetrics and non-routine lingo referenced in this article. For further reading on what these stats are, what they mean and how they are calculated please visithttps://library.fangraphs.com/getting-started/)
July 31, 2017 – The Chicago Cubs were on a win-now playoff push with the corner infield positions anchored by Kris Bryant and Anthony Rizzo. Meanwhile, prospect Jeimer Candelario was in AAA for the Iowa Cubs, nearly ready to play every day in the big leagues. With his positions blocked on a team looking for immediate upgrades Candelario would have to get his opportunity with a new club. The Detroit Tigers acquired Candelario and Isaac Paredes from the Cubs in exchange for veterans Justin Wilson and Alex Avila.
Candelario’s first full season with the Tigers showed a lot of promise. At age 24, he slashed .224/.317/.393 with 19 HR, 54 RBI and a 93 wRC+ in 2018, the production of a hitter 7% below league average. Combined with his defensive value at third base his production netted 2.4 fWAR, the total of a solid MLB regular. It appeared the Tigers acquired an average-to-slightly-below-average power hitter with good defense to help the rebuilding efforts.
The 2019 season did not go as smoothly for Candelario, however. His strikeout and walk rates stayed about the same but the power had disappeared. In 94 games he slashed .203/.306./.337 with 8 HR for a wRC+ of 72, the production of a hitter 28% below league average. Only Candelario’s defense saved him from posting net-negative value with 0.2 fWAR, or in other words: a replacement-level player. Candelario went from a promising young prospect to a potential bust in just a calendar year.
Key: Slash line – batting average/on-base percentage/slugging percentage. wRC+ – weighted runs created plus. fWAR – FanGraphs formula for wins above replacement. Replacement-level – the statistical value of a fringe major-leaguer
On the surface these numbers are very similar. Many of the categories that would need improvement had improved from 2018 to 2019. Here is an extensive but not comprehensive list: K%, BB%, xBA, xSLG, EV, HardHit%, xwOBA, ZoneSwing%, LineDrive%, and a decreased GroundBall%. The results of 2019 do not make much sense on paper compared to 2018. Candelario became a better baseball player with worse production.
While it is likely true Candelario suffered from bad luck that impacted his production in 2019, Statcast is not a religion. As opponents learned more about Candelario they learned how to get him out more frequently. His skills were improving under the current approach, but this did not transition to results on the field. Something had to change.
Key: K% – strikeout percentage. BB% – walk percentage. xBA – expected batting average. SLG – slugging percentage. xSLG – expected slugging percentage. Exit Velocity (EV) – average speed of baseball in mph off the bat. xwOBA – expected weighted on-base average. ZoneSwing% – swing rate at pitches inside the strike zone.
The Framework and the Breakout
With his career on the line, Candelario erupted in 2020. Across 52 games in the pandemic-shortened season he slashed .297/.369/.503 with 7 HR, 29 RBI, 136 wRC+ and a 1.5 fWAR. To understand what led to this breakout, it first needs to be understood what makes him unique.
Jeimer Candelario’s plate discipline skills have been a highlight of his play since his prospect status. After becoming an everyday player in 2018, Candelario’s plate discipline transitioned well into the Major Leagues. This skill has been the framework to his success ever since. Each year he has placed himself well above the league average in pitches per plate appearance (Pit/PA) and posted solid walk rates. His 4.10 Pit/PA in 2021 ranks 30th of all qualified hitters in Major League Baseball.
Candelario vs league average among qualified hitters according to Baseball Reference
Jeimer Candelario Pit/PA
Player League Average Pit/PA*
*Player league average Pit/PA is calculated per 600 PA on bbref
As his plate discipline improved Candelario has seen fewer pitches without sacrificing walks. His 2021 walk percentage is currently the highest of his career at 11.2%. This can be explained by improved pitch recognition and contact skills. His strikeout percentage has decreased each season since 2018 and currently sits at 21.8%. This is the lowest mark he has posted since becoming an everyday player and sits below the league average of 23.5% in 2021. To further explain, here is a batted ball profile of Candelario from FanGraphs.
On the most basic level Candelario is swinging the bat more often each season. Unlike the previous three seasons in which his contact rate decreased in each subsequent season, Candelario is now making more contact than ever before. His in-zone contact percentage has increased each season, too. The most notable change in this graphic is Candelario’s in-zone swing percentage. Without sacrificing walks or increasing strikeouts he is significantly more aggressive attacking pitches in the strike zone.
For my non-baseball-savvy readers, here is the summary: More walks, more swings, more contact, more power, more aggression and less strikeouts. The foundation of a complete hitter.
Wait, foundation? What could be missing from the puzzle that has not yet been covered? The most important piece of all: launch angle.
Key: O – outside of strikezone. Z – inside of strike zone
The Final Form
For those who have followed baseball over the past decade, the launch angle revolution transformed the 2010s. In general, hitting the ball in the air more frequently resulted in better offensive production and more home runs. The thing about baseball is that there is no rule of thumb to hitting. Each player possesses a unique profile that contributes to their success or failure.
After his promising first full season the Tigers and Jeimer Candelario had reason to believe their approach combined with his skillset would produce power. They were wrong. The game adapted to this model. The more Candelario put the ball in the air with his swing path, the more outs he made. In 2020, this model was scrapped for a new one. By changing the trajectory of the baseballs Candelario hit, the Tigers changed the trajectory of his career.
Batted ball data from Statcast Baseball Savant
Average Launch Angle
After having success with 19 home runs in 2018 the Tigers and Candelario attempted to build on this by hitting more fly balls. His average launch angle and fly ball percentage increased from 2018 to 2019. While Candelario steadily improved his underlying skills, he was not meant to play under this model. His production plummeted and soon prognosticators were talking about Candelario like his days as a Tiger might be numbered.
Searching for answers amidst the launch angle revolution, Candelario and the Tigers went in the opposite direction, literally and figuratively. From 2020 to present day, Candelario’s new approach paid huge dividends. His game power manifested with a lower launch angle focused on hitting line drives. Attempting to hit fly balls for power was no longer at the forefront of his approach. With his skill improvements, this change in approach quickly lit up the stat sheets.
Across a larger sample in 2021 this approach has been tweaked. However, it is proving 2020 was no fluke. In 110 games Candelario is slashing .279/.363/.433 with a 120 wRC+ and 2.3 WAR. His 32 doubles are tied for second in all of baseball. The most value was found in Candelario’s play by harnessing his skills to create gap-to-gap power, especially in Comerica Park.
On a non-statistical note, it is becoming a lot of fun to watch Candelario play. His personality is a fan favorite, his confidence is soaring with consistent production on the field, and he is showing emotion more consistently and controlling it to get the most out of his game. It seems the best days of his career are ahead. It would be a mistake for the Tigers to let those happen anywhere other than Detroit.
Spencer Torkelson likely gets a crack at third base in 2022, Candelario’s primary position, but positional versatility is more important than ever in today’s league. Candelario already has experience at first base; he and Torkelson being able to play both corner infield positions will add more flexibility to the roster.
Candelario is set to hit free agency in 2024. With Miguel Cabrera approaching the end of his career, the Tigers will most likely need to fill a corner infield position in 2024, if not sooner than that. Spend money, Chris. #ExtendCandy.
Bally Sports Detroit color commentator Jack Morris has been suspended following a major faux pas in last night’s Angels/Tigers broadcast. During the sixth inning of last night’s broadcast, Morris performed a piss-poor caricature of an Asian accent during Shohei Ohtani’s at bat, which soon prompted an apology… of sorts:
We’re not here to speculuate about what Morris’ intentions might have been or debate whether or not he was trying to imitate a cartoon character (who has no relevance to Ohtani). The fact he apologized later on in the game, on air, seems telling. The fact Bally Sports responded swiftly and decisively, also seems to speak volumes:
It’s simple: Morris messed up. It is unacceptable, especially for someone in his elevated position, to do this. Ohtani is having an MVP-caliber season and we’ve now had multiple instances of broadcasters and sportswriters lashing out with racist comments and culturally insensitive jokes rather than celebrating his considerable talents.
This is not an example of so-called “cancel culture” taking down a good man for no reason. This is an example of a man who committed an error in judgment and is now facing the consequences of his actions. Morris should take the time to reflect on why he chose to do what he did and why his behavior was inappropriate and potentially hurtful. If he’s given another chance with Bally Sports, one can only hope Morris uses this experience to grow as a person.
Oh now I know writing this article is going to be very fun given how Tigers Twitter reacted to the drafting of Jackson Jobe, so why don’t we get right into it. This might’ve been the best start to a Tigers draft that we’ve seen in a very long time. In drafting Madden and Jobe, the Tigers have seemingly selected two frontline starters that can help the team compete for years to come.
Jackson Jobe, 3rd overall
The controversial pick, the pick that’ll have Tigers Twitter ranting and raving about for the foreseeable future just like a certain Tigers writer has done for last three years about Mize and Kelenic.
Prep shortstop Marcelo Mayer was available for the Tigers at three. Mayer would’ve filled an organizational role that the Tigers desperately needed, and they still passed on him to get the guy they felt most comfortable with. This is where the disconnect is, with scouts and experts raving about the Jobe selection while Twitter goes on about how much this pick sucks and how Jobe is an abject failure from a lame duck GM. The actual scouts that work in baseball for a living did nothing but rave about how talented Jobe is and how this pick was utterly fantastic, crediting the Tigers for sticking to their guns and listening to the scouting and analytics departments about Jobe.
To quote what a scout told me about Jobe: “I love Jackson Jobe. He’s the best prep arm I’ve ever scouted but taking prep arms that high is historically, objectively risky. That’s just the facts… but Jobe is the arm in this class who could be SPECIAL.”
This is pretty in line with the scouting report we got in this tweet from Brian Sakowski:
3. Tigers: Jackson Jobe, RHP, Okla. HS. Top prep arm in the class, potentially 80-grade slider, into upper 90’s this spring, CB/CH both project above average, spin data is absurd, case to be made this is the highest pure upside pick in the class. #DetroitRoots#PGDraft
Jobe features a potential 70 fastball and a 3200 RPM slider that’s a potential 80 (the max on the 20/80 scale), and two above average pitches in his change and curve, 55 on that scale. The wide array of pitches make his arsenal an absolutely elite and eclectic mix, a mix that will keep hitters from being able to sit on certain pitches because the others in his arsenal lag far behind. With an underslot value for Jobe at that, it was the perfect fit for them and helped set up their next pick.
This isn’t a make or break pick and the Tigers have had great success with prep pitchers, more specifically in flipping them, and his profile is completely different than Beau Burrows’ was. Jobe is a window extender, possibly. They’ve really pushed their elite talents through the farm to the show fast in the past when they’ve felt it necessary, with Porcello and Turner both within two years of draft, but if they slow play it he could be to the Tigers what Dustin May and Walker Buehler are to the Dodgers: window extenders.
Ty Madden, supplemental A, Pick 32
And to the steal of the draft, Ty Madden. What an outrageous fall for Madden, for reasons that range from signability concerns to data driven concerns that MLB Network mentioned about his fastball, though no one is completely sure. The Tigers will take this and run laughing all the way home yelling “no take backs.” Ranked #9 by MLB pipeline, he’s got a prototypical pitcher’s frame at 6’3 and 220, and is an absolute unit on the mound with a high 90’s fastball and a good slider.
Brian Sakowski has another great succinct report:
32. Tigers: Ty Madden, RHP, Texas. This’ll be an overpay, Madden was in play in the top 10 overall. FB up to 98-99 mph, slider is plus pitch that misses bats, big performance for Omaha club, good value for sure. #PGDraft
Madden may need work on a change-up but it doesn’t seem like it’s that far behind and the Tigers have shown the ability to help pitchers develop a third pitch, especially changeup (remember Michael Fulmer?) so there are a lot of encouraging signs here and a lot to like about these top two picks. Some publications have concerns that Madden may be a reliever long-term with his limited arsenal but other reports that are floating out there are very encouraged by his changeup, even with his limited use of it.
The Tigers are able to replace two elite graduating pitchers in Mize and Skubal with two incredibly elite arms, and one of them has flat out, seemingly, Cy Young-caliber potential. It’s time for Chris Fetter to work his magic in the offseason with these guys, and the rest of the Tigers coaching staff in the minors to assist him and the players and turning them into the best possible versions of themselves.
For those of you who have made the unfortunate decision to follow me on Twitter, you’ll know that I don’t think Al Avila is all that bad a General Manager. He’s no Dave Dombrowski (which, to be fair, nobody is Dave Dombrowski, the greatest general manager of his generation), but the guy was tossed into a bad situation and has mostly done what he’s needed to do. The farm system has gone from terrible to very good, with most services having it ranked in the top five. The Tigers have bolstered their analytics department, have hired a new-school manager in AJ Hinch, have moved in on big names in the international market (Cristian Santana being the most recent), and have fully embraced pitching analytics with the hiring of Chris Fetter.
With the news of Boston’s intent to trade Andrew Benintendi, this a player the Tigers should see as a prime trade target to bolster a team, and outfield, desperately in need of an injection of talent. The Tigers are rolling into 2020 with an outfield, but what the outfield actually is nobody knows.
JaCoby Jones, a personal favorite, always seems to be on the cusp of a realization of potential until a freak injury happens, while Victor Reyes tears the cover off the ball and had a good 2020 but whether he can piece it all together in a full season remains to be seen. Newcomer Robbie Grossman and holdovers Daz Cameron and Christin Stewart round out the outfield options and I’d expect a heavy rotation of all 3 of those last options.
Could the Red Sox’s Andrew Benintendi be a good fit for the Tigers? (photo by Alexandra Simon)
This is where Benintendi can bring stability and talent to the roster. Andrew is a former top 10 pick, former top prospect in baseball, and a player that had a tumultuous 2020 during the pandemic that turned up to the season TOO in-shape, may be looking for a change of scenery according to Marlins reporter Craig Mish.
Per sources Red Sox continue to be open to moving OF Andrew Benintendi. Marlins and several other clubs are pursuing. Miami has pieces that make sense and looking for RF help. Change of scenery type move, if it happens. It could.
AJ Hinch has stated that the Tigers are looking for a players that hit righties well and Benintendi does just that. With a career OPS of 821 against righties and a wRC+ of 115, and a 10.5% walk rate against both handedness, he’s the perfect injection of offense that the Tigers need. Not an overly powerful guy, he does give you 15 to 20 homers a year with good gap power, a future table setter for Torkelson that can also drive runs in when needed. Athletic and agile with an average arm, he’s perfect to patrol one of the corners in Detroit.
Benintendi has 2 years left on his contract at an average of 5 million a year as a 26 year old, an easily affordable contract given that the Tigers are currently 30 million dollars behind in spending this year as opposed to where they were last year. What also makes this attractive is that as a player without a lot of team control and in a market where we just watched Lindor and Darvish be traded for peanuts, Benintendi should come relatively cheaply with Daz Cameron likely being the best piece going back to Boston. If Boston wants a pitcher in return, it’s just as easy to swap Cameron with Faedo and give Packard or Kody Clemens. The Tigers have a top system in the league with good depth to work from that would make a trade like this work well for both sides involved.
Game 6: Rays 1, Dodgers 3. LA wins the World Series 4-2
After their conservative approach to game 2, the Dodgers rested their best arms and threw everything at the Rays for games 3-5. Outside of a catastrophic 9th inning meltdown in game 4, the Dodgers were able to secure an advantage in the series 3-2. They won games 3 and 5 after clutch pitching performances from Walker Buehler and Clayton Kershaw.
Going into game 6, the Dodgers faced an identical matchup to game 2: Tony Gonsolin vs. Blake Snell. Snell dominated in game 2, surrendering only a 2-run home run to Chris Taylor as the Rays went on to win 6-4. In game 6, Snell picked up right where he left off; he carved through the Dodgers’ lineup, striking out five of the first six batters.
The Rays’ Randy Arozarena broke the scoring open in the first inning, taking a slider to the opposite field for a single-postseason record 10th home run. The Dodgers’ game plan was to have Gonsolin function as a regular starter. That plan quickly fell apart as his pitch count elevated and he struggled to throw strikes. Gonsolin exited having thrown just 48 pitches in 1.2 innings.
Everything changed in the 6th inning for the Dodgers. Battling with a one run deficit, the offense finally arrived. Austin Barnes led off the 6th inning with a single up the middle off Blake Snell. It was just the second hit given up by Snell at that point, on only 73 pitches. With one out and one on in the 6th, Rays manager Kevin Cash pulled Snell and went to the bullpen.
The Rays turned to reliever Nick Anderson. After missing in location with the first few pitches, he gave up a double down the line to Mookie Betts. With Austin Barnes at third and Mookie at second, Anderson spiked a slider that got away from Mike Zunino and the game was tied. With Corey Seager batting next, he weakly grounded to first and similarly to game 1, Mookie made a phenomenal jump and beat out the throw to score a critical run.
The former MVP came up huge for the Dodgers. (photo by Alexandra Simon)
With this appearance, Anderson had given up a run in his 7th consecutive postseason appearance, breaking the previously held record by José Paniagua with the 2000-2001 Seattle Mariners. As Cash’s plan imploded, so did the Rays’ season. This begs the question, did Kevin Cash cost the Rays a championship? The obvious answer seems to be yes. My answer? No, but he is not free from blame. More on that later.
Mookie again proved why he is worth every penny of his 12-year $365 million extension. He homered in the 8th, extending the Dodgers’ lead to 3-1 and sealing victory for a long-awaited championship in Los Angeles.
In a similar fashion to game 7 of the NLCS, Julio Urías entered the game and pitched 2.1 perfect innings to close out the World Series. The Dodgers bullpen went on to do everything asked of them and Dave Roberts played his matchups perfectly. They threw 7.1 scoreless innings, striking out 12 batters and giving up just 2 singles. The Dodgers won the 2020 World Series and ended a 32-year title drought.
Kevin Cash’s management was less than perfect, but analytics are not to blame.
It seems easy to bash the decision to remove Blake Snell. It prompted an onslaught of anti-analytics rhetoric and how it “ruins the game.” Here’s the breakdown by the numbers.
Removing Blake Snell was the correct analytical decision. Snell last completed 6 innings of work in July of 2019. After hitting the upper 90s with his fastball for most of the night, the last fastball Snell threw was his slowest of the night, registering at 94.3 mph. This season, including the postseason, here are Blake Snell’s splits each time through the batting order entering game 6.
Snell 2020 Splits
It is no question Snell’s effectiveness decreases the longer he stays in the game, and with more appearances the opponents’ power jumps off the charts. With former MVP Mookie Betts stepping to the plate for a third time and a lefty/righty matchup, it was the correct decision to end the night for Snell and move to the bullpen. Kevin Cash’s choice of Nick Anderson is where he made a fatal mistake.
Nick Anderson had been dominant in the 2020 regular season posting a 0.55 ERA, a strikeout rate of 44.8% and posting an even 1.0 WAR. The postseason was a different story, however. Entering game 6, he had given up a run in 7 of his 9 postseason appearances, with 6 of those runs allowed coming in consecutive appearances. He posted an ERA of 5.11, had given up 15 hits, 4 walks, 3 home runs and collected just 9 strikeouts in 14.1 innings. To put it simply, he was bad.
Peter Fairbanks or Diego Castillo were better options to face Betts. Cash’s trust in an underperforming Anderson in the biggest moment blew up in his face, and the Rays lost the World Series. This was not an analytical decision. This was a mistake.
This may raise the question, “You argued in favor of Brandon Lowe last article about sticking with the best players in the biggest spots. Doesn’t this contradict the argument?”
It is a little complicated, but the argument is different for two reasons. First, the Rays do not have many offensive weapons, as the previous article stated. They ranked in the lower half of the league in most offensive categories. Demoting Lowe in the batting order or replacing him entirely likely would not yield different results. Sticking with Lowe in the two hole gave the Rays critical home runs that provided them victories in game 2 and 4. He had proven himself to stay in his role, delivering in the clutch to keep the Rays’ season alive. The second reason is the Rays are known for their arsenal of relief arms. They can plug many different talented relievers in different situations to find success. The difference here is Anderson’s performances had presented no recent signs of success, and his failure cost them the World Series. The Rays had more reliable options to turn to that they failed to use.
So, analytics are not to blame, Kevin Cash royally screwed up and the Rays lost. The blame goes to Kevin Cash, right? Well, again, it’s not so simple.
The Rays have managed baseball games in this style for years, and it rewarded them with an AL pennant, coming up just 2 victories short of a championship. The way the Rays play baseball was a massive success. There was no reason for them to abandon their philosophy with their season on the line. The failure lies within their choice of replacement, not the removal of Snell itself. Cash can be blamed for his mistake, but the holes in the Rays roster that were repeatedly exposed by the Dodgers were out of his control.
Andrew Friedman is a genius and Rays owner Stuart Sternberg cost them the World Series.
Friedman, President of Baseball Operations for the Dodgers, previously made a name for himself with the Tampa Bay Rays. As Friedman and Sternberg shared a love for the analytics, they began to mold the former expansion franchise into what it is today. Friedman started his career in their front office in 2004 and became the club’s General Manager in 2005. In 2008, the Rays reached their first World Series. The Rays continued to field successful teams despite coming up against their big money counterparts within the AL East.
In 2014, Friedman left the Rays for the Dodgers, bringing along his analytical model and marrying it with the Dodgers’ big spending ways. Since 2014, the Dodgers have been the most successful team in baseball and show no signs of slowing down soon.
The Tampa Bay Rays were third to last in baseball with a 2020 payroll of $28.3 million. The biggest trick of the league is owners making us believe there are “small markets” and “big markets.” The reality is there are just big markets and bigger markets. The Dodgers had a payroll of $107.9mil, second behind only the Yankees. When one takes into consideration the value of these franchises, the Rays are still not proportionately spending as much on their roster as the Dodgers. They might not be able to afford players like Mookie Betts or Clayton Kershaw however, they can easily afford some free agent upgrades to improve their roster. The highest paid player on the Rays was Charlie Morton at $15 million before pro-rated for the shortened 2020 season. He is one on a very short list of free agents for Tampa Bay.
The Rays offense sputtered in the World Series. Their inability to score runs ultimately led to their demise. The Rays were forced to rely on inadequate offensive options in the face of one of the greatest teams ever constructed. It is a remarkable achievement and a testament to the players and coaching staff that they only fell 2 games short of a title.
The blame for the Rays failure resides with Stuart Sternberg, who refused to invest into his product. With a few offensive upgrades, the current Rays roster likely turns the tide against LA and probably doesn’t end up in the situation of preserving a 1-0 lead to save their season. No manager is perfect. Cash’s mistake was his own doing. Without a lineup to provide any cushion, though, Sternberg created the situation for his manager to fail.
Where do the Tigers end up in all this?
This World Series is a lesson to all that a lack of investment is not enough to win. Against their toughest challenge, the Rays’ formula crumbled. It was not solely because of analytics; it was not solely because of Kevin Cash. It is because they refuse to spend money at the rate of their competition.
What’s next for Al Avila and the Tigers? (photo by Alexandra Simon)
The Dodgers are truly MLB’s model franchise. Their commitment to analytics and a payroll of All-Stars won them a championship. Tigers owner Chris Ilitch is a multi-billionaire. With the Tigers’ commitment to analytics, they are taking the right steps toward success. Since they started their rebuild in earnest in 2017, they have consistently avoided spending money and produced subpar results. This rewarded them with top prospects Casey Mize, Riley Greene and Spencer Torkelson through the draft.
Unfortunately, these players won’t be enough to bring a championship to Detroit. As the Tigers emerge from the rebuild, it is time to spend and spend big. Through the Ilitch family, the Tigers have the power to establish themselves as leaders of the new school, marrying the analytical approach with a large payroll. Will they seize the opportunity? Or will greed hinder their opportunities in their franchise’s most important moments? Only time will tell.
It was no surprise to once again see the Los Angeles Dodgers in the World Series. With an extensive number of homegrown All-Stars, a commitment to analytics and a top ranked farm system, they have dominated the regular season for nearly a decade. Although the Dodgers have failed to secure a title, their eighth consecutive division title and third NL pennant in four years somehow feels like just the beginning for Dodgers fans.
Although they held the best record in the American League at 40-20, the Tampa Bay Rays are a different story. Branded as a “small market” team in the AL East, constantly contending with the powerhouse franchises of the Yankees and Red Sox is a difficult feat. However, in the past 3 seasons the Rays’ commitment to analytics and player development is consistently paying off. Their surplus of prospects from their top ranked farm system and bullpen of flamethrowers won them 90 games in 2018, 96 games in 2019 and a .667 win percentage in the shortened 2020 season, second in baseball to the Dodgers.
Though the Tigers became known as an “old-school” franchise that did not rely heavily on advanced analytics, the Tigers have made great strides in modernizing the organization since Al Avila took over GM duties. The franchise has installed Statcast at all their developmental facilities, created their own analytical database CAESAR, and plucked hires from the Driveline talent pool, to name a few. They now find themselves behind only the Rays as the second ranked farm system. Through consecutive top picks and an improved drafting strategy, the Tigers have quickly risen as one of the league’s most exciting groups of young talent. All signs point to following the model of the new-school franchises. As the Tigers emerge from the rebuild over the next few seasons, will this new model resemble the Dodgers, the Rays, or somewhere in-between? Can the Tigers find sustained success?
As we speak, the Detroit Tigers — yes, those Detroit Tigers — are in contention for the eighth and final American League wild card spot. Yes, we know what you’re saying. The Tigers don’t have a chance. It’s just a pipe dream. The odds are against them. There are too many better teams ahead of them. They’ll never make it in so why bother.
Jeimer is leading the way. (photo by Alexandra Simon)
These are all justifiable positions one could take on the current state of the Detroit Tigers’ postseason hopes. Detroit Tigers fans are used to having their hopes and dreams stomped on and spit upon by the Detroit Tigers.
The sharp sting of our postseason disappointments are still fresh and painful. The fanbase is reluctant to be hopeful in a season, a year, where Murphy’s Law reins supreme. The Tigers don’t have a chance so why should I get my hopes up? Why are you enjoying this? They’ll just blow it in the end. Don’t you remember 2006-2011-2012-2013-2014-2016, etc.
Why get our hopes up? Well, why not.
Casey Mize and Tarik Skubal are headlining the youth movement in the Tigers’ rotation. Isaac Paredes, Willi Castro, Daz Cameron, and other prized position prospects are emerging from the haze of the alternate training site. The bullpen is finally — FINALLY — somewhat competent! For the first time in four years the Tigers are dancing around the edges of the wild card hunt! The Tigers’ farm system is among the top ranked systems in baseball after years of being maligned for the lack of depth. And there are even more exciting prospects on the verge.
Why shouldn’t we enjoy the ride? Who knows when the next playoff race will find its way back to Detroit? The Tigers went nearly twenty years between postseason appearances not so long ago. Are we all so jaded that a close wild card race isn’t enough to shake us from our perpetually negative, fatalistic mindset?
It’s okay to embrace things that are fun, and have hope that good things will come. Wild card races, regardless of the likely result, are fun and good. Let yourself enjoy it. Sometimes the ending point isn’t what truly matters, it’s the journey taken, the memories made along the way, and the promise of a better future just on the horizon.
However, historically bad teams are hard to actually build. Last year was largely the result of a perfect storm of horrible: regression by Miguel Cabrera, Josh Harrison, and Jeimer Candelario; injury issues on the part of Jordy Mercer, JaCoby Jones, Tyson Ross, Matt Moore, and Michael Fulmer; and historically bad performances by rookies like Grayson Greiner and Christin Stewart.
Two good things happened to the Tigers at the major league level last year, and their names were Matthew Boyd and Niko Goodrum.